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THE CONDOM CONTROVERSY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
RESPECTING A MINOR'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY
PILAR S. RAMOSt
"Condoms seldom escape controversy.
Their very mention can provoke an uproar."'
INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 1991, the New York City School District
became the largest in the United States to make condoms available
in its public schools.2 Ultimately, 260,000 students in 120 high
schools would be able to receive condoms on request without their
parents' permission.' The New York City Board of Education, which
adopted the plan in February of 1991 after months of hearings on
the issue,4 considered and specifically rejected a resolution that
would have given parents the right to exclude their children from
the condom availability program. Since then, several other cities
and counties have implemented condom availability programs,6 not
only for pregnancy prevention, but also as a means of inhibiting the
rise of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") cases among
today's adolescents. At some schools, teenagers must have permis-
sion from their parents before they can obtain condoms, while at
other schools teenagers are free to receive condoms without the
mandatory involvement of their parents.
t BA 1994,J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Pennsylvania. I thank my mother,
Esperanza Ramos, for her infinite wisdom and my fianc6, Kaihan Krippendorff, for
surviving law school with me. I am indebted to Erin Brennan for her patience, good
suggestions and out-of-this-world editing. I also thank the University of Pennsylvania
for seven enlightening years.
'Jeff Stryker, Condom History and Lore, in CONDOMS IN THE SCHOOLS 135 app. V.,
at 137 (Sarah E. Samuels & Mark D. Smith eds., 1993).
2 See Nick Chiles, Condoms in Schools; Program Starts Today; Debate Goes On, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 26, 1991, at 6; Bethany Kandel, Free Condoms in New York Schools, Streets, USA
TODAY, Nov. 27, 1991, at 10A.
'See Kandel, supra note 2, at 10A.
' See Joseph Berger, School Board Approves Plan for Condoms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1991, at B1.
' See Dennis Hevesi, Board Rejects 'Opt Out' Plan on Condoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1991, at B1.
I A list of existing and proposed condom availability programs is contained in the
Appendix to this Comment.
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The "condom controversy" is not really a debate over the idea of
making condoms available in public schools.' The real debate in the
condom controversy revolves around whether a school board should
or may require some form of parental involvement in the student's
decision to obtain condoms at school-either by parental consent
"opt-in," by parental veto "opt-out," or by parental notification.' A
minority of parents have furiously protested the idea of schools
making condoms available to their children without mandatory
parental consent.
Much of the attention that this debate has received has focused
on these parental objections and the rhetoric of parental rights. The
condom controversy, therefore, hasjoined the wider debate over the
idea of constitutionalized "parental rights."9 Although litigation, or
threatened litigation, over condom availability programs in the
schools may seem widespread, there are to date only three reported
cases on the issue.' In all three cases, suit was filed by parents
' See infra note 51 and accompanying text (citing statistics that show that most
adults support some form of condom availability in the schools).
8 See Barbara Solomon, Legal Issues, in CONDOMS IN THE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at
63, 74 (explaining that whether school districts have "the duty or the authority to
require parental consent or notification" in their condom availability programs "is the
most difficult and sensitive issue").
The terms parental consent "opt-in," parental veto "opt-out," and parental
notification describe the different levels of parental involvement in condom
availability programs. In a program with a blanket parental consent requirement, the
school presupposes that a student is not eligible to obtain condoms unless the parent
consents to the child's participation-this is known as an "opt-in" requirement. A
parental "opt-out" provision, on the other hand, presumes that all students are eligible
to participate in the condom availability program unless the parent objects and "opts"
the child "out" of the program. A program with a parental notification requirement
would merely notify parents when their children have sought to obtain contraceptives
at school. See Robert Leitman et al., A Survey of Condom Programs, in CONDOMS IN THE
SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 1, 8-9 & tbl.4. As of the 1990-1991 academic year, one in
five students who attended school in districts with condom availability programs were
in "opt-in" districts, two in five were in "opt-out" districts, and one in three were in
"notification" districts. See id.
' See, e.g., Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning
of ParentalRights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 978 (1988) ("Recently... courts and legislatures
have been called upon increasingly to determine the appropriate extent and even the
legitimacy of the exercise of parental rights to care and control of children in a variety
of novel settings."); see also id. at 979 ("Whenever a person discusses a problem in
terms of parental rights, such a person is immediately suspected of viewing children
as merely chattel of their parents. Courts and commentators have become sensitive
to this association and consequently now tend to address the problems being raised
in these areas as involving questions of family integrity or family autonomy."
(footnotes omitted)).
"9 See Curtis v. School Comm., No. 92518, 1993 WL 818795 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
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challenging the logistics of the program, namely, the parental
involvement provision or the lack thereof. The parents argued that
programs that do not mandatorily involve parents in the student's
decision violate constitutionally protected parental rights." A
decision on the merits in one of these cases is still pending, 2 and
in one of the two cases in which the substantive issues were decided,
the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari. 3 The holdings of
the two decided cases conflict, and condom availability in public
schools remains a contested issue.
Remarkably, none of these cases seriously address the issue of
whether blanket parental consent "opt-in," "opt-out," or notification
requirements in condom availability programs would instead infringe
upon the minors' rights. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has
held that minors have a constitutionally protected right of privacy,
including the right to obtain contraception. 4 Although this right
is not unlimited, the lack of attention the three cases have given to
minors' rights seems misguided in light of the fact that teens who
seek contraception before engaging in sexual intercourse demon-
strate a level of maturity and responsibility that should be recog-
nized. 5
7, 1993), affd, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996); Alfonso
v. Fernandez, 584 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), rev'd, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993); Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., No. 1389, 1992
Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 116 (C.P. CL Phila. County Nov. 10, 1992), rev'd and remanded,
646 A.2d 689 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1994), removed to federal court, No. CIVA96-3791, 1996
WL 442887 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1996).
1 See infra Part I.C.
12 See Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., No. CLV.A.96-3791, 1996
WL 442887 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1996).
's See Curtis, 116 S. Ct. at 753. The questions presented to the Court for certiorari
were:
(1) Did Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court err by holding, in square
conflict with decision of New York appellate court, that public school
provision of condoms to unemancipated minor students without parental
consent and despite parental objections is constitutional?
(2) Did Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court err by holding that public
school provision of condoms to unemancipated minor students without
parental consent and despite parental objections does not burden parental
rights?
64 U.S.L.W. 3386 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1995) (No. 95-617).
14 See infra Part II.A.2.
But see Lynn D. Wardle, Parents' Rights vs. Minors' Rights Regarding the Provision
of Contraceptives to Teenagers, 68 NEB. L. REV. 216, 250 (1989) (arguing that "the policy
dispute regarding parental involvement when contraceptives are provided to [minors]
is ... [not] controlled by either of the constitutional privacy doctrines"-neither
parental rights nor minors' privacy rights).
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This Comment seriously questions the constitutional propriety of
parental consent-type requirements in the school condom availability
program context by analyzing the rights of minors subjected to these
types of requirements. It contemplates that minors have a right to
be free of, or to have an alternative to, the very parental consent
requirements that parents argue are necessary in school condom
availability programs. Part I of this Comment will explain how the
condom controversy developed. It discusses the realities of teen
sexual activity-exposing the immense public health problem and the
unique threat of AIDS-and how those realities served as catalysts for
the controversial condom availability programs. Part I then reviews
the reported cases concerning condom availability programs and
argues that, because these cases adopted a myopic view of the family
and the parent-child relationship, they failed to address an equally
important interest at stake: the minors' rights.
Part II of this Comment argues that minors' rights play an impor-
tant role in the condom controversy. The first section explores the
strides that have been made in the context of minors' rights and
traces the right of privacy as it has been applied to minors in the
contraception context and the abortion context. Drawing on the
recent countertrend to parental rights rhetoric, the second section
of Part II argues that a true concern for minors' interests dictates a
reconceptualization of the family and the parent-child relationship
so that children's needs and experiences are meaningfully consid-
ered. Part III then analogizes the arguments for respecting a minor's
right of privacy in the abortion context and the nonschool contracep-
tion context to the school condom program context. This Part
argues that minors' needs and experiences blur the distinction
between the availability of condoms in the school setting and their
availability elsewhere. Ultimately, legislatures, school boards and
courts must consider minors' interests from the real perspective of
minors in evaluating whether parental consent requirements are
appropriate for condom availability programs. The combination of
the rights that minors have already been accorded with a child-
centered perspective proves that the answer is simply no.
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE CONDOM CONTROVERSY
A. The Public Health Problem
Human beings have a natural drive for sex-it is a fact of life. 6
Adolescents 7 are no exception. Rather, adolescence is the period
during which an individual begins to explore and experiment with
her sexuality. Beginning in the 1950s, the proportion of sexually
active teenagers increased steadily. 8 Although the number of teens
having sex has leveled off in the 1990s, 9 there is still cause for
concern.2 0 More than half of all high school students report
engaging in sexual intercourse, 21 and a significantly greater percent-
age report being sexually active. 22 By age nineteen, 75% of girls
and 86% of boys have experienced sexual intercourse. 23 Despite
" See Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Kids and Contraceptives, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1987,
at 54, 56 (quoting an AIDS researcher's assertion that "[a]fter food and sleep, you
are dealing with the third most powerful drive we have .... [a]nd sex is the most
powerful nonsurvival drive'").
17 The terms "adolescents," "students," "minors" and "teenagers" will be used
interchangeably to indicate persons under the age of majority. For purposes of this
Comment, the adolescent need not be of childbearing age since a sexually active girl
who is not yet capable of becoming pregnant may still be infected with a sexually
transmitted disease.
18 See Teen Sex No Longer Increasing, U.S. Says, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 1995, § 1, at 3.
19 See id.
20 See Condom Use Increases Among Youths, Study Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1995, at
A4 [hereinafter Condom Use Increases] ("'We're very concerned that the percentage of
young people who are engaging in intercourse remains so high.'" (quoting the
Centers for Disease Control Adolescent and School Health Director)).
21 The rate was 53% in 1993, 54.1% in 1991, and 54.2% in 1990. See id.; Centers
for Disease Control, Sexual BehaviorAmongHigh School Students-United States, 1990,40
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 885, 885-86 & tbl.1 (1992) [hereinafter Sexual
Behavior). Quite expectedly, the percentage of sexually experienced students
increased with each successive grade. See id. Even the lowest percentage, that of the
ninth grade, was significant-39.6%. See id; see also Centers for Disease Control,
Health-Risk Behaviors Among Persons Aged 12-21 Years-United States, 1992, 43 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 231, 234 (1994) (noting that, according to 1992 data, more
than 43% of 14- to 17-year-olds, and almost 82% of 18- to 21-year-olds, report having
had sexual intercourse).
22 The distinction between engaging in sexual intercourse and merely being
"sexually active"--but not engaging in sexual intercourse-is significant because
although one group is not yet having sex, both groups are at risk of contracting a
sexually transmitted disease. See Centers for Disease Control, Selected Behaviors That
Increase Risk for HIV Infection Among High School Students-United States, 1990, 41
MORBIDITY & MOgrALITY WKLY. REP. 231, 237 (1992) (reporting that among all
students in the ninth through twelfth grades, 64.8% of male students and 52.4% of
female students become sexually active before celebrating their seventeenth birthday).
I See Patricia Hersch, Teen Epidemic: Sexually Transmitted Diseases Are Ravaging Our
Children, AM. HEALTH, May 1991, at 42, 44.
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the prevalence of sexual activity, "the vast majority of sexually active
teens do not use condoms [regularly]. '2 4 Moreover, "[o]ne-quarter
to one-third of sexually active adolescents never use any form of
contraceptive."
25
High-risk sexual behavior among teenagers has caused great
public concern. For the past two decades, the primary focus has
been on the alarming rate of adolescent pregnancy.2 6 The United
States has the highest rate of teen pregnancy in the industrialized
world.27 Some efforts have been made to remedy that problem. 8
24 Sally Guttmacher et al., Parents' Attitudes and Beliefs About HIV/AIDS Prevention
with Condom Availability in New York City Public High Schools, 65J. SCH. HEALTH 101, 101
(1995) (citingJoseph A. Catania et al., Predictors of Condom Use and Multiple Partnered
Sex Among Sexually-Active Adolescent Women: Implications for AIDS-Related Health
Interventions, 26 J. SEX RES. 514, 514-24 (1989); Ralph Hingson & Lee Strunin,
Monitoring Adolescents' Response to the AIDS Epidemic: Changes in Knowledge, Attitudes,
Beliefs, and Behaviors, in ADOLESCENTS AND AIDS: A GENERATION INJEOPARDY 17, 17-33
(RalphJ. DiClemente ed., 1992) [hereinafter ADOLESCENTS AND AIDS]; and Leighton
C. Ku et al., The Association of AIDS Education and Sex Education with Sexual Behavior and
Condom Use Among Teenage Men, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 100, 100-06 (1992)); see also
Louis HARRIS & Assoc., INC., AMERICAN TEENS SPEAK: SEX MYTHS, TV, AND BIRTH
CONTROL-THE PLANNED PARENTHOOD POLL 66 (1986) (reporting that only 25% of
females and 47% of males report using condoms as a primary contraceptive method).
Condom use, although not necessarily consistent use of condoms, does seem to
have increased among teenagers. When asked whether they used a condom the last
time they had sex, 52.8% of high school students in 1993 said they had used a
condom compared with 46.2% in 1991 and 44.9% in 1990. See Condom Use Increases,
supra note 20, atA4; Sexual Behavior, supra note 21, at 887 tbl. 3. Nevertheless, "'[i]n
this era, with sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV infection so prev-
alent... [52.8% is) not nearly enough.'" See Condom Use Increases, supra note 20, at
A4 (quoting the Centers for Disease Control Adolescent and School Health Director
(alteration in original)).
2- Donna L. Richter et al., Correlates of Condom Use and Number of Sexual Partners
Among High School Adolescents, 63J. SCH. HEALTH 91, 91 (1993) (emphasis added).
26 By 1976, approximately one million females aged 15 to 19 and about 30,000
females under 15 were becoming pregnant each year. See Michael N. Finger, Parental
Notification as a Prerequisite for Minors' Access to Contraceptives: A Behavioral and Legal
Analysis, 13 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 196, 201 (1979) (citing Frederick S. Jaffe &Joy G.
Dryfoos, Fertility Control Services for Adolescents: Access and Utilization, 8 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 167, 167 (1976)). Two-thirds of these pregnancies were unintended. See id.
at 201-02; see also Donald Schoemaker, Sex Education: The Dissemination of Family
Planning Services and Contraceptives in Public School 8 J. LEGAL MED. 587, 593 (1987)
("[T]here were about 897,000 premarital pregnancies in [1982); 30% ... ended in
abortion; 12% ... ended in miscarriage; and just under 50% ... resulted in live
births .... [249,000] young women became single parents in 1982."). Moreover,
studies show that most teens do not decide to seek contraception until after they have
already engaged in some sexual activity. See id.
27 SeeALAN GUTTMACHER INST., SEX AND AMERICA'S TEENAGERS 76, 77 fig.55 (1994)
(noting the high rate of teen pregnancy in the United States, "even though levels of
adolescent sexual activity are about the same" in other industrialized nations and that
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Since the late 1980s, however, it has undoubtedly been the AIDS
epidemic29 that has led to an emphasis on the importance of safe
sex.
30
Significantly, "[t] eenagers appear to be one of the fastest growing
age groups in contracting AIDS.""' So striking is the infection rate
"[in most other industrialized societies, there is greater openness about sexual
relationships").
28 In response to public outcry, and to combat the social problem of teen pregnan-
cy, Congress enacted the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act,
which established and funded a comprehensive program of voluntary family planning
services, including clinics. See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504, 1506 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 300 (1994)). This Act became Title X of the Public Health Service Act,
enacted in 1944 to "promote the coordination of, research, investigations, experi-
ments, demonstrations, and studies relating to the causes, diagnosis, treatment,
control, and prevention of physical and mental diseases and impairments of man."
Public Health Service Act, ch. 873, § 301, 58 Stat. 682, 691-92 (1944) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1994)). These clinics later became the subject of
intense litigation over a minor's right to confidential access to contraceptives. See
infra note 127 and accompanying text.
29 AIDS and its virus, human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"), were "officially"
recognized in June 1981, in a Centers for Disease Control report on the disease. See
CHARLES PERROW & MAURO F. GUILLtN, THE AIDS DISASTER 15 (1990). By 1989
between 1-1.5 million Americans and 4.5-10 million people worldwide were estimated
to be infected with HIV. See Karen Hein, Adolescents at Risk for HIV Infection, in
ADOLESCENTS AND AIDS, supra note 24, at 3, 3.
10 Adolescents in the 1990s are the "first 'AIDS generation.'" Hein, supra note 29,
at 3. The effect of the AIDS crisis on the adolescent population, as distinguished
from younger children or adults, is now being studied. See id. at 8 (noting that there
are significant differences in "transmission category profiles" among children,
adolescents and adults, and listing four rationales for the separate study of
adolescents). The adolescent population has to be studied as a whole rather than
according to the traditional risk groups, such as homosexuals and intravenous drug
users, because
[a]lthough some teenagers are clearly at increased risk compared with
others, risk status currently may be more a reflection of geography (i.e.,
prevalence of HIV in a given area) than being a member of a "risk group."
By adulthood, the majority of adolescents will be at risk for acquiring HIV
because most will have had several partners. Risk-related behaviors cross
over from traditional risk groups to all adolescents who are sexually experi-
enced.
Id.
11 Eugene C. Bjorklun, Condom Distribution in the Public Schools: Is Parental Consent
Required?, 91 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 11 (1994). Although adolescents still account for a
relatively small percentage of overall AIDS cases nationally, 21% of all individuals
diagnosed with the AIDS virus are between the ages of 20 and 29, which indicates,
given the lengthy HIV incubation period, that "a substantial proportion of these
individuals were infected while they were teenagers." Jeff Stryker et al., Condom
Availability in Schools: The Need for Improved Program Evaluations, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1901, 1901 (1994).
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that between January and September of 1993, a period of only nine
months, 980 male adolescents and 435 female adolescents were
afflicted with AIDS 2-- more infections than the combined number
of cases reported over a fifty-four-month period from 1987 to
1991."8 AIDS has now become the sixth leading cause of death
among 13- to 24-year-olds.14 Predictions are that AIDS will continue
to menace seriously the adolescent population 5 and that the
incidence of HIV infection among adolescents "will rise dramatical-
ly." 6  Although notorious for believing they are invincible, 37 at
least some teenagers are becoming frightened by the possibility of
contracting AIDS.8
32 See Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Right to Consent to Health Care, 10
ToURo L. REv. 637, 637-38 n.1 (1994) (citing Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't
of Health and Human Servs., 5 HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. 11, 11 tbl.8 (3d quarter
ed. 1993)).
33 In June 1987, there were 148 reported cases of AIDS in the 13-19 age group.
In June 1989, there were 389 reported cases. By January 1991, the number of
reported cases had almost doubled to 646. See Bjorklun, supra note 31, at 11; see also
The Top 10 Health Trends, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 4, 1992, at 94, 94-95
(reporting that between 1990 and 1992 the number of teenagers with AIDS had
increased by 70%).
34 SeeADvoCATES FORYOUTH, SCHOOL CONDOM AVAILABILITY: THE FACTS 1 (1995)
[hereinafter FACTSHEET] (citing Annual Summary of Births, Marriages, Divorces and
Deaths: United States, 1993, 42 MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 25 (1994)). AIDS is the
leading cause of death for people between 25 and 44 years old. See id.
" See Hein, supra note 29, at 4 (stressing that in this age group, "AIDS deaths...
increased 100-fold between 1981 and 1987" and that "[i]f current trends continue,
AIDS could well be among the top five causes of death for young people ... in the
next few years").
" Guttmacher et al., supra note 24, at 101 (noting that despite the fact that "the
vast majority of sexually active teens do not use condoms ... most HIV-positive
teenagers do not know their serostatus"). Teenagers also have a high incidence of
sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs") other than HIV-roughly 25% of sexually active
teenagers become infected with an STD every year. See FACTSHEET, supra note 34, at
1 (citing ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 27, at 38); see also Bryanna LaToof,
Increase in Teen Sex Paced by Rise in Disease, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 25, 1994, at ID
("Adolescents experience higher rates of sexually transmitted disease (STD) than any
other age group and are the least likely to seek medical treatment.").
s7 See Patricia Hersch, supra note 23, at 44 ("Part of the explanation for the STD
epidemic among teens lies in the very nature of adolescence, a heady, defiant time of
raging hormones, behavioral experimentation-and, ominously, a feeling of
invulnerability."); Douglas Kirby, School-Based Prevention Programs: Design, Evaluation,
and Effectiveness, in ADOLESCENTS AND AIDS, supra note 24, at 159, 174 ("Numerous
people have written about and/or documented this general perception of invulnera-
bility on the part of teenagers, and others have documented that most young people
do not feel at risk of AIDS." (citation omitted)).
1S See, e.g., Gail Collins, Lettuce Drag City's Fee4 NEWSDAY, Jan. 12, 1994, at 6
(quoting a 16-year-old Brooklyn student's plea to the school board: "'You didn't go
through this when you were young. It's scary being out here. We're not living in this
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B. Educational Efforts to Ameliorate the Public Health Problem
1. Sex Education in the Schools
Sex and health education curricula in public schools date back
to the early 1920s.39 These programs, generally designed to combat
the social problem of teen pregnancy, have withstood public
opposition 0  and legal challenges.4' Today, sex education is
common in public schools.42 Moreover, since the advent of AIDS,
83% of public school districts have implemented specific AIDS/HIV
educational efforts.4  Despite these educational efforts and the
availability, although somewhat limited, of federally funded family
planning clinics that provide indigent minors with contraceptives,
44
the problems associated with risky teenage sexual activity have not
been significantly reduced.4 5 The issue, thus, is not so much one
of mere knowledge, but one of practice.
46
little crystal ball. It's better to be educated and protected than blindfolded with your
hands tied.'").
11 See Schoemaker, supra note 26, at 596 (stating that "[clontrary to popular
belief," more than 40% of high schools provided some kind of sex education in the
early 1920s).
4 See FERNAND N. DUTILE, SEX, SCHOOLS AND THE LAW 47 (1986) (describing
public opposition to a sex education program in San Mateo County, California and
noting that "sex education courses present a unique controversy").
41 See KarlJ. Sanders, Comment, Kids and Condoms: Constitutional Challenges to the
Distribution of Condoms in Public Schools, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1479, 1481-89 (1993)
(discussing judicial responses to parental challenges to sex education curricula).
42 See DUTILE, supra note 40, at 47-48 (stating that more than 50% of public and
private schools had sex education programs by the 1970s).
43 See Study: AIDS-Prevention Classes Often Fail to Teach Condom Use, CHI. TaIB., Sept.
6, 1996, § 1, at 18. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia required AIDS-
prevention education in 1994, up from 13 states in 1987. See id. Many other states
have specifically encouraged it. See Bjorklun, supra note 31, at 12.
4 See supra note 28, and infra note 127 (discussing the courts' invalidation of a
regulation requiring parental notification of minors who received contraceptives from
federally funded clinics).
45 See Sexual Behavior, supra note 21, at 885 ("Since the 1970s, sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs) (including [HIV infection and [AIDS]), unintended pregnancies,
and other problems that result from sexual activity have increased among adolescents
in the United States."); see also Hein, supra note 29, at 8 ("Despite the fact that most
teenagers were well aware of the AIDS epidemic by the mid-1980s, an accelerated
increase occurred in the proportion having premarital sex from 1986 to 1988." (citing
Centers for Disease Control, Premarital Sexual Experiences Among Adolescent Women-
United States, 1970-1988,39 MORBIDITY & MORTALIIYWKLY. REP. 929, 929-32 (1991))).
4 SeeJoY G. DRYFOOS, ADOLESCENTS AT RISK 23 (1990) ("Repeated surveys have
shown that teenagers know a lot about AIDS, at least as much as adults, but that they
have not changed their behavior in regard to the use of condoms."); Luciana Lagani
& David M. Hayes, Contraceptive Health Programs for Adolescents: A Critical Review, 28
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2. Condoms in the Schools
Efforts to stem the tide of teen pregnancy and the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS, focus on condoms as
the most effective preventative devices.47 Scores of school districts
throughout the country have considered making condoms available
in public schools and many have already implemented condom
availability programs.4 8 The Massachusetts State Board of Educa-
ADOLESCENCE 347, 355 (1993) (encouraging, after reviewing several educational
programs on contraception, an element of "caution in interpreting the positive results
concerning changes toward a broader acceptance of contraception among teenagers
... [because] stated willingness to use contraception may not mean that contraceptive
behavior would actually change. This may be the most critical limitation of all the
programs that have been described").
17 Laboratory studies have shown that the use of latex condoms during vaginal
intercourse is 97.5% effective in preventing pregnancies, and 99.9% effective when
combined with spermicides in preventing STDs, including HIV. SeeFACTSHEET, supra
note 34, at 2 (citing Philip Kestelman &James Trussell, Efficacy of the Simultaneous Uses
of Condoms and Spermicides, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 226, 227 (1991)).
The federal government has also recognized the benefits of condom use. In a
pamphlet entitled Understanding AiDS, which was sent to every American household
in June 1988, the U.S. Public Health Service acknowledged that "'condoms are the
best preventative measure against AIDS besides not having sex.'" Bjorklun, supra note
31, at 12 (quoting Understanding ALDS); see also PERROW & GUILLtN, supra note 29, at
26 (discussing the conflict surrounding the publication of UnderstandingAIDS). Two
recent former surgeon generals also indicated their support of condom use. Former
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, after recommending abstinence, admitted that, "'an
individual must be warned to use the protection of a condom.'" Bill Barol et al., Koop
and Bennett Agree to Disagree, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1987, at 64, 64. Former Surgeon
General Joycelyn Elders even kept a condom "tree" in her office. See Bob Cohn,
Goodbye to the 'Condom Queen, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 19, 1994, at 26, 26.
4 As ofJanuary 1995, condoms were available in some public schools in at least
21 states and the District of Columbia, either through school-based health clinics or
through a schoolwide or districtwide program. See CONDOMS IN THE SCHOOLS, supra
note 1, at 131 app.IV; ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, CITIES WITH SCHOOLS OFFERING
CONDOM AVAILABILITY PROGRAMS, UPDATE FACTSHEET (Jan. 17, 1995) (on file with
author and ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH). For a detailed list of each district and the type
of program approved or rejected, see the Appendix of this Comment.
Several states actually prohibit the prescription, dispensation, distribution or
other dissemination of contraceptives in school. See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-773 (a) (1)
(1996) (providing that "[n]o facility operated on public school property or operated
by a public school district and no employees of any such facility ... shall ... (1)
[d]istribut[e] ... contraceptives" to public school students); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:281A(3) (West Supp. 1996) ("No contraceptive or abortifacient drug, device, or
other similar product shall be distributed at any public school."); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-79-5(8) (Supp. 1996) ("School nurses shall not dispense birth control pills or
contraceptive devices in the school. Dispensing of such shall be the responsibility of
the State Department of Health on a referral basis only."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.611.4
(West Supp. 1996) ("Contraceptive devices or contraceptive drugs shall not be
provided by school personnel or their agents."); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-405, 59-32-
THE CONDOM CONTROVERSY
tion, realizing the gravity of the public health problem among
adolescents, has affirmatively recommended that every school
committee in the state consider condom availability programs as a
supplement to the general HIV/AIDS prevention education
program.49 Although the idea of providing minors access to
condoms in school has drawn heated debate, 0 surveys indicate that
80(d) (Law Co-op 1990) ("No contraceptive device or contraceptive medication may
be distributed in or on the school grounds of any public elementary or secondary
school."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-1-1205 (1988) ("While present on the property or
premises of any local education agency or while otherwise engaged in the activities of
the program, no... employee shall.., prescribe any form of birth control device or
contraceptive."); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.004(b) (West 1996) ("A school district
may not distribute condoms in connection with instruction relating to human
sexuality."); Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 189-103 (Dec. 4, 1989) ("[S]chool-based clinics
may not dispense birth control contraceptives to pupils.").
Some states prohibit the use of public funds to purchase or dispense contracep-
tives in school. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-703(c) (1) (Michie 1993) ("No state funds
shall be used for the purchase or dispensing of contraceptives or abortifacients in
public schools."); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-773(b) (1996) ("The Department of
Education and local units of administration are prohibited from utilizing state funds
for the distribution of contraceptives."); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-13-21 (c) (Supp. 1995)
("No funds shall be expended to support school based clinics dispensing contraceptive
methods."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.93 (4) (a) (West 1987) ("Funds received by an
organization under a grant awarded [by the Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention and
Pregnancy Services Board] may not be used for ... [p]urchasing or dispensing
contraceptives in adolescent health clinics located in schools."). As the prevalence of
AIDS among adolescents increases, it will be interesting to observe if, and/or for how
long, these proscriptions will last.
11 Specifically, the Board recommended that "'every school committee, in
consultation with superintendents, -administrators, faculty, parents and students
consider making condoms available in their secondary schools.'" FACTSHEET, supra
note 34, at 2 (citing ADvOCATES FOR YOUTH, CONDOM AvAILABILITY IN SCHOOLS: A
GUIDE FOR PROGRAMS (1993)). To date, Massachusetts is the only state with such a
policy. See id.
50 See Leitman et al., supra note 8, at 9 ("Among districts in which the program has
been implemented since the 1990-91 school year, all have received formal complaints
about the program and virtually all (95%) have experienced lawsuits."); Jeff Stryker
et al., Executive Summary, in CONDOMS IN THE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at ix, ix ("When
the schoolyard becomes the crucible for the condom debate, some highly charged
questions emerge concerning the role of parents, the church, and the state in
influencing the sexual behavior of adolescents.").
One of the major controversial issues is the unsupported belief of some parents
that dispensing condoms in public schools will increase the rate of sexual activity
among minors. The few studies that have been published indicate that this view is
flatly mistaken. See Lagand & Hayes, supra note 46, at 356 ("The myth that knowledge
of, and easy accessibility to, contraception promote promiscuity can be dispelled by
examining the empirical data . .. ."); FACTSHEET, supra note 34, at 1 (citation
omitted). In a recent study comparing the programs implemented in Chicago and
New York City, with Chicago as the control, preliminary data also reveal a lack of
correlation between condom availability programs and increased sexual activity. See
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a significant majority of American adults, in addition to minors, favor
the "distribution" of condoms in public schools.5 1 Irrespective of
moral, religious or cultural values, it appears that a majority of
Americans recognize the deadliness of the AIDS virus, along with the
seriousness of the teen pregnancy problem, and accept the need for
an equally serious educational defense mechanism.5 2
C. Three Legal Challenges: A Focus on Parental Rights
In objecting to condom availability programs, parents have
argued that they have a right to direct the education and upbringing
of their children, and that condom programs without parental
consent provisions violate that right. In each of the three reported
cases, parents have relied on what have become known as the
foundation cases for parental rights: Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society
Telephone conversation with Professor Sally Guttmacher, School of Public Health,
New York University (Jan. 1995). The results of this study on the effectiveness of
condom availability programs, the most comprehensive to date, have not yet been
published.
51 See Bjorklun, supra note 31, at 14 (reporting the results of a Gallup/Phi Delta
Kappa poll, which showed that 68% of respondents in 1992 approved of the
availability of condoms in public schools, while 60% approved of it in 1993); Roper
Org., AIDS: Public Attitudes and Education Needs, June 1991, available in WL, Poll
Database (indicating that 64% of respondents favored condom availability programs
in senior high schools to help control sexually transmitted diseases).
"Distribution" is a misnomer for the programs. Schools are not distributing
condoms. They are making condoms available to those students who request them.
Condoms are made available to students in a variety of ways. Some schools have
school-based health clinics. See FACTSHEET, supra note 34, at 2. The program in
Baltimore, Maryland, for example, uses such clinics to make condoms available to
students. See id. Other programs provide condoms through vending machines, such
as the program in Seattle, Washington. See id. Some schools make condoms available
through "health resource centers" within the school, which are staffed either by
trained volunteers, or by nurses and health educators from outside family planning
clinics. See id. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania has such a program. See id. Other schools,
such as those in Commerce City, Colorado, make condoms available through licensed
physicians and trained school faculty advisors. See id. Still other programs make
baskets of condoms available at nurses' offices, from which students may freely take
condoms. See id.; see also Douglas Kirby, Research and Evaluation, in CONDOMS IN THE
SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 89, 91. In no program, however, are students in any way
required to seek or receive condoms.
52 See Stanley M. Elam et al., The 24th Annual Gallup/Phi Delta Kappa Poll of the
Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, 74 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 41, 42 (1992) ("Public
support for the distribution of condoms in schools-support that undoubtedly would
have been lacking a few years ago-reflects not so much a shift in perceptions of
morality as a belief that such a step will reduce the number of teen pregnancies and
the likelihood that students will contract AIDS or other sexually transmitted
diseases.").
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of Sisters and Wisconsin v. Yoder." As shall be seen through the logic
of the courts in the three reported condom program cases-although
the Supreme Court has protected parental rights in certain circum-
stances, the cases in which the Court has done so should not be
readily expanded to protect parents in the context of condom
availability programs.
In Alfonso v. Fernandez, the New York City Board of Education
decided to adopt a condom availability program. 4  The program
did not include any parental consent or notification provisions.
55
Some parents fervently argued that they had a right to opt their
children out of the condom availability program, and that the
absence of an opt-out provision violated their constitutionally
protected parental right to raise their children as they saw fit.56
5s In 1923, the Supreme Court acknowledged that parental rights were entitled to
protection from unnecessary state interference in Meyer v. Nebraska See 262 U.S. 390,
399-400 (1923). In invalidating a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of
foreign languages to students below the eighth grade level in public schools, the
Court expanded the list of rights embodied within the Fourteenth Amendment to
include an individual's right to "marry, establish a home and bring up children." Id.
at 399. Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Supreme
Court, relying heavily on the new parental right announced in Meyer, invalidated an
Oregon law that required parents to send their children between the ages of eight and
sixteen to public school. See id. at 530, 534-35. The Court reasoned that the law
impermissibly interfered with the rights of those who raise children. See id. at 534-35.
Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court affirmed the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's reversal of the convictions of Amish parents who had refused to send
their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children to school, in violation of Wisconsin's
compulsory education law. See id. at 207. The Court stressed the importance of
balancing the interests involved: "[A] State's interest in universal education, however
highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancingprocess.. . ." Id. at 214 (emphasis
added).
14 In Alfonso, condoms were available to students upon request and were dispensed
by trained professionals in health resource rooms set up in the public schools. See
Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.YS.2d 259, 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Although students
were not required to participate in the program, once a student requested condoms
she was required to receive guidance counseling "involving the proper use of
condoms, and the consequences of their use or misuse." Id.
11 See id.; see also Hevesi, supra note 5, at B2. The public health circumstances
surrounding the implementation of programs without parental consent provisions
shed light on the implementation decision. In New York City, then-Chancellor of New
York City schools, Joseph A. Fernandez, cited the prevalence of AIDS as a partial
explanation: only 3% of the nation's adolescent population (13- to 21-year-olds) lived
in NewYork City, yet New York City was home to 20% of the nation's adolescent AIDS
victims. See Nick Chiles, New York to Schools: 'Use Condoms, 'WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1991,
at R16; see also supra notes 30-33 (discussing the prevalence of AIDS among teenagers
generally).
-1 See Alfonso v. Fernandez, 584 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). The
parents also argued that the program as implemented violated their constitutional
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The lower court in Alfonso reasoned that since student participation
in the program was voluntary, the burden on parental rights was
insufficient to constitutionally require a parental opt-out provision.
5 7
The New York appellate court in Alfonso reversed the lower court by
a 3-2 decision despite a strong and lengthy dissent.5"
The appellate court in Alfonso first characterized the condom
availability program as a health service. The program, therefore,
violated the common law and statutory prohibitions against providing
medical treatment without prior parental consent.5 9 The court then
turned to the parents' "well-recognized liberty interest in rearing and
educating their children in accord with their own views."60 It
reasoned that there was no sufficiently compelling state interest to
justify the parents "being forced to surrender a parenting right-
specifically, to influence and guide the sexual activity of their
children without State interference." 1 The program was ruled
invalid without a parental consent requirement.
62
right to the free exercise of their religion. See id. at 408. This Comment will not
address this claim. Nevertheless, every decision that has been made on the Free
Exercise claim in these condom availability cases has held that the programs do not
violate the parents' Free Exercise rights. See, e.g., Atfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267
(holding that "'a governmental requirement that a person be exposed to ideas he or
she finds objectionable on religious grounds'" does not constitute a burden on free
exercise as proscribed by the First Amendment (quoting Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987))).
57 See Alfonso, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 412; cf. Curtis v. School Comm., No. 92518, 1993 WL
818795, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 1993). For a more in-depth analysis of the
lower court opinion in Alfonso, see Bjorklun, supra note 31, at 16-20 (discussing the
parental rights and Free Exercise claims as well as the dissent); Sanders, supra note
41, at 1498-1505 (discussing the parental rights and Free Exercise claims).
I" See Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 268-75 (Eiber, J., dissenting). Judge Eiber first
rejected the majority's view that the condom programs constituted a health service.
See id. at 269-72. She then rejected the majority's attempt "to bring this case within
the ambit of Meyer v. Nebraska and its progeny." Id. at 272 (citation omitted). She
stated:
Although placing a health resource room in each high school where
condoms and educational information about their use are available may
make condoms more readily accessible to teenagers, the fact that students
are in closer proximity to a potential source of contraceptive devices does
not change the fundamentally voluntary nature of the program.
Id. at 273.
19 See id. at 264-65.
60 Id. at 265.
61 Id. at 266.
62 The court concluded:
[T]he respondents are prohibited from dispensing condoms to unemanci-
pated minor students without the prior consent of their parents or
guardians, or without an opt-out provision, and... (1) it is declared that
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In Curtis v. School Committee,63 a case almost factually identical to
Alfonso,64 a school board, despite parental opposition, voted to
adopt a condom availability program without any parental involve-
ment provisions.65 The Massachusetts Superior Court rejected the
parents' argument and granted summary judgment to the defen-
dant.6  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unanimously
upheld the lower court's grant of summaryjudgment. The supreme
court asserted that, "[w]hile courts apparently have not explicitly
stated that 'coercion' is the standard, they have not proceeded
the condom availability component of the respondents' plan is a health
service rather than health education and thus, in the absence of a provision
requiring the prior consent of unemancipated minor students' parents or
guardians, or in the absence of an opt-out provision, lacks common-law or
statutory authority; and (2) ... [t]he respondents' plan to dispense
condoms to unemancipated minor children without the consent of their
parents or guardians, or an opt-out provision, violates the civil rights of the
parent petitioners and similarly-situated parents or guardians under the
substantive due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and New York Constitution ....
Id. at 275-76.
For political reasons, the decision was not appealed. See Sanders, supra note 41,
at 1511 n.183 (discussing the criticism and political backlash received by the
Chancellor for not involving parents in the program implementation). The program
was later modified to comply with the court's decision-it adopted a parental opt-out
provision, whereby parents were sent a consent form and asked to return it only if
they did not want their children to participate in the program. Significantly, less than
2% of parents chose to opt out their children. See Guttmacher et al., supra note 24,
at 105.
1652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995).
1 One significant difference between Curtis and Alfonso is that the condom
availability program in Alfonso was also challenged on statutory grounds. The parents
in Alfonso argued that distributing condoms was a "health service" and was therefore
governed by a specific state statute requiring parental consent before any minor could
receive such a service. See Alfonso v. Fernandez, 584 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408-09 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1992). The lower court rejected this argument, but the appellate court ultimately
agreed with the parents on this issue. See id.; Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259,
263 (N.Y App. Div. 1993).
11 In Curtis, condoms were available to both junior and senior high school
students. In the junior high, students could receive condoms from the school nurse
after receiving counseling. In the senior high, students could either request free
condoms from the school nurse or buy them for $.75 per package from vending
machines located in the boys' and girls' restrooms. Counseling was provided to those
who requested it and informational brochures were available in the nurse's office. See
Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 582-83.
' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recounted the superior court
decision: "Thejudge concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the threshold
requirement for each of their claims because they were unable to demonstrate that
the condom-availability programs placed a coercive burden on their rights." Id. at
583.
1996]
164 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145: 149
further in the constitutional analysis unless the governmental action
has had a coercive effect on the claimants' parental liberties."
67
After distinguishing the Meyer line of cases, upon which the parents
in Curtis and the appellate court in Alfonso had relied,68 on the
ground that the element of compulsion that had been a decisive
factor in those cases was absent in Curtis,69 the supreme court
concluded: "Although exposure to condom vending machines and
to the program itself may offend the moral and religious sensibilities
of the plaintiffs, mere exposure to programs offered at school does
not amount to unconstitutional interference with parental liberties
without the existence of some compulsory aspect to the program. "70
The third case concerning condom availability programs, the
merits of which have not yet been reached, nevertheless provides
interesting insights. In Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. School
District, the Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia
adopted and implemented a condom availability program.7 1 In
contrast to the programs in Alfonso and Curtis, the program included
67 Id. at 585, 587.
s The Meyer line of cases, the court argued,
strongly impl[iesJ that, in order to constitute a constitutional violation, the
State action at issue must be coercive or compulsory in nature. Coercion
exists where the governmental action is mandatory and provides no outlet
for the parents, such as where refusal to participate in a program results in
a sanction or in expulsion.
Id. at 586.
69 See id. The Curtis court heavily relied on a Sixth Circuit opinion, Doe v. Irwin,
615 F.2d 1162 (1980), which decided essentially the same question but in the context
of a publicly funded family planning center that refused to implement a parental
notice provision before dispensing contraceptives to minors. See Curtis v. School
Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 585-86 (Mass. 1995). The Irwin court recognized that "[a]s
with adults, the minor's right of privacy includes the right to obtain contraceptives,"
and it distinguished the line of cases establishing parental rights. See Irwin, 615 F.2d
at 1166-68 (stating that the parental rights cases involved state-imposed compulsory
requirements or prohibitions, an element lacking in Curtis). Finally, the Irwin court
refused to consider whether the clinic's policy constituted a compelling state interest
since there was no element of compulsion, as there had been in the parental rights
cases. See id. at 1168-69.
70 Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 586. In so concluding, the court also rejected the
argument that compulsory attendance laws created a sufficiently strong burden on
parental rights: "'[T] he mere fact that parents are required to send their children to
school does not vest the condom... program with the aura of "compulsion" necessary
to make out a viable claim of deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right.'" Id.
at 587 (quoting Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(Eiber, J., dissenting)).
7' The school board had adopted Policy 123, which provided that condoms be
made available upon request at school-based health clinics. See Parents United for
Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., 646 A.2d 689, 690 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1994).
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a parental opt-out provision.72 Nonetheless, Parents United for
Better Schools ("PUBS"), a non-profit organization which consisted
of many parents whose children attended public schools in Philadel-
phia, and several individual parents filed suit alleging, inter alia, that
a parent's "right to affirmatively consent prior to the rendition of
health or medical services at school is violated by the ... 'opt-out'
provision."7M The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas dismissed
the suit for lack of standing, 74 but the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania reversed that decision and remanded the case for a
decision on the merits.'75 Although the parents had tried to couch
their parental rights' argument in nonsubstantive due process
language, the case was recently removed to federal court despite the
parents' strong objection. 76 The parents' reluctance to litigate the
federal substantive due process parental rights claims indicates their
own doubts as to the strength of those arguments in the context of
condom availability programs. The substantive claims have not yet
been decided. 7
72 The principals of the program's pilot schools mailed consent forms and letters
explaining the program and instructing parents to reply only if they did not wish for
their children to participate. See id.
"' Id. Parents United was the first reported case in the United States concerning
condom availability programs in public schools. See Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606
N.Y.S.2d 259, 265 n.* (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
1 See Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., 1992 Phila. Cty. Rptr.
LEXIS 116, at *8 (C.P. Ct. Phila. County Nov. 10, 1992) (reasoning that because the
opt-out provision guaranteed parents a part in the child's decision of whether to
obtain condoms, the plaintiffs "ha[d] n't suffered any infringement.... Consequently,
they lack standing.., to maintain this action").
" See Parents United, 646 A.2d at 692 (concluding, after a review of statutory and
common law, that "the principle that a parent must consent to certain activities prior
to the commencement of those activities, while not an absolute right or without limit,
is nevertheless a recognized and substantial interest that can be protected"). The
court made sure to clarify that it was not deciding any merits of the case. See id. at
691 n.3 ("The issue of whether distribution of condoms is a medical service or
medical treatment is not relevant to our analysis of PUBS' standing to sue, nor is our
discussion intended to express any opinion on that aspect of Policy 123.").
'6 The case was removed to federal court on the grounds that the parents relied
on the Meyer line of cases in a reply memorandum to the school board's motion for
summaryjudgment, thereby raising a Fourteenth Amendment federal question. See
Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., No. CIV.A.96-3791, 1996 WL
442887, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1996).
77 The case is now pending in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. See id. at *1.
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II. THE ROLE OF MINORS' RIGHTS IN THE CONDOM CONTROVERSY
The reported cases dealing with condom availability programs in
school settings have so heavily focused on the allegedly infringed
rights of the parents that the right of the minor to obtain contracep-
tion has been almost completely ignored.78 No case contemplated
whether the minor had any right to be free of the very parental
consent requirements for which the parents were arguing. The
courts' focus on the Meyer line of cases, whether analogized or
distinguished, helps explain the oversight of minors' rights.79 Meyer
and Pierce have been strongly criticized as having "constitutionalized
a narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as private property," a
vision which has distorted family law and national family policy.8"
" Cf Curtis v. School Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 n.9 (Mass. 1995) (distinguish-
ing cases that had upheld parental consent requirements for minors in the abortion
context, stating that "[w]hile these cases reaffirm the Court's respect for the parent-
child bond and encouragement of parent-child communication, these cases place the
privacy interests of minors in a position superior to parental liberties," and explaining
that in the abortion cases "the Court upheld the parental consent requirement only
because the law in issue also provided an alternative to parental consent"); Alfonso
v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) ("Holding that the condom
availability component of the program is unauthorized in no way affects or restricts
[a minor's] access to condoms which existed prior to the adoption of the plan.").
Although the parties mentioned the issue of a minor's right to obtain condoms,
it certainly was not central to their arguments and was usually addressed in a
tangential manner. See Brief for Appellees at 8-9 & n.4, Curtis v. School Comm., 652
N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995) (No. SJC-06684) (mentioning that a "[p]arental veto over a
minor child's access to contraception is unconstitutional" but directing the reader to
outside sources for a discussion of this issue); Reply Brief for Appellants at 5-9, Curtis
v. School Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995) (No. SJC-06684) (stating that "this is
not a case about restricting a minor's access to contraceptives" and emphasizing
parents' interest in raising their children); Brief Amicus Curiae at 12-15, Parents
United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., 646 A.2d 689 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1994) (No.
2670 CD 1992) (focusing on parental consent and privacy issues rather than minors'
rights); see also Sharon Pomeranz, Note, Condoms Overturned on Appeal: Teens Stripped
of Their Rights, 4AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 219, 230-34 (1995) (arguing that, because the
competing rights of minors and parents have been balanced in abortion cases, the
Alfonso appellate court should have done so).
" See Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the
Abortion Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 629 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's adherence to "parental rights precedents" is "inapposite because those cases
dealt with parents' rights as balanced against state interests, not parents' rights as
against those of their children" (citation omitted)).
" See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 998, 1000-01 (1992) (exposing "the
dark side of Meyer and Pierce," which declared "a dangerous form of liberty, the right
to control another human being"). Professor Woodhouse argues that during the years
leading up to the Meyer and Pierce decisions, there were "sharply divergent visions of
relationships between child, parent, and state that competed for ascendancy" in the
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Traditionally lauded as symbols of liberalism because the parents'
individual rights prevailed over the state's interests, Meyer and Pierce
have also been interpreted in a less flattering light-they deny
minors their own voice and identity, and instead render minors
"conduit[s] for the [ir] parents' religious expression, cultural identity,
and class aspirations."81 Meyer and Pierce, therefore, only allow a
parent's voice to be heard, and not the child's." This rhetoric of
parental rights is what has dominated the discourse on school
condom availability programs thus far. It is imperative, however, to
discuss the controversy from the perspective of the minors involved,
because "[s]tamped on the reverse side ... of family privacy and
parental rights are the child's voicelessness, objectification, and
isolation." 3
A. Privacy: A Minor's Need and Established Right
Minors have only recently been declared "persons" deserving of
rights and protections under the Constitution.84 Traditionally,
courts applied a "parental presumption"85 to questions concerning
United States. See id. at 1036. While the patriarchal theory of the family had
historically governed, Lockean theories of parental "trusteeships," which viewed the
children as free individuals merely entrusted to parents for nurturing, began to
challenge and coexist with the patriarchal theory. See id. at 1039-40. Under
collectivist notions of child and family, children's rights could be "positive claims on
the community," instead of merely "shields against parental power." Id. at 1054-56
("These descriptions of children's rights had a decidedly different ring from the
political rights of the liberal tradition."). Ultimately, the Court ignored the emerging
pluralism and "elevated into constitutional doctrine a particular notion of [family]
relations, grounded in patriarchal traditions that had acquired the force of natural law
in the opinions of a majority of theJustices." Id. at 1100.
81 d. at 1114. Yoder has also been criticized for ignoring the voices of minors. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
82Although society may presume that parents speak for their children,
.constitutionalizing this presumption as the parents' 'right' to speak, choose, and live
through the child has led to its being too often invoked in situations in which it is, at
best, unnecessary or, at worst, oppressive." Woodhouse, supra note 80, at 1115. For
an argument that parental consent requirements are necessary in condom availability
programs, see Miranda Perry, Comment, Kids and Condoms: Parental Involvement in
School Condom-Distribution Programs, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 727, 751-55 (1996) (arguing
that, because of these fundamental parental rights cases, school condom availability
programs should be strictly scrutinized and that only programs with mandatory
parental consent "opt-in" provisions can pass this heightened standard of review).
' Woodhouse, supra note 80, at 1001.
84 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969) (holding that First Amendment rights extend to minors as well as adults); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (holding that procedural due process is guaranteed to
minors as well as to adults).
I See Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children
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minors' legal rights. Moreover, the extent to which rights have been
accorded to minors has depended on whether an individual's
capacity to exercise that right has been presumed.86 In other words,
the law seeks to protect minors from "hidden dangers" that adults are
capable of detecting when making important decisions.8 7 Thus,
minors' rights generally are not coextensive with the rights of
adults.88 It has been clearly established, however, that minors,89 as
well as adults, have a fundamental right to obtain and use contra-
ceptives.9" What remains unclear is whether, and to what extent, a
state may regulate access to contraceptives.
This section traces the evolution of the right of privacy since it
was first articulated and applied to adults in the contraception
context. Next, it examines the Court's extension of the right of
privacy from the contraception context to the analogous abortion
context. Finally, the extension of the right of privacy to minors, first
in the abortion context and then in the contraception context, is
examined.
Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1209, 1211 (1994) (arguing that "the historical
preference given to parents" should be adapted to "give greater recognition to the
rights of the child").
I See Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 644-56
(distinguishing "rights of protection" that protect an individual from undue state
interference, from "rights of choice" that permit an individual "to make affirmative
choices of binding consequences," and arguing that the latter require a certain degree
of capacity for individual choice, and thus are justifiably limited as related to minors).
17 See Andrea L. Morano, Note, The Right of Minors to Confidential Access to
Contraceptives, 47 ALB. L. REv. 214, 217 (1982-1983) (arguing that "[s]omewhere
between these two ends of the spectrum [situations in which there is no danger of
unforeseen harm and those in which that danger does exist] lie situations where the
hidden dangers posed to a minor are counterbalanced by strong policy arguments for
allowing the exercise of the right in question").
I See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(extending to minors the right to obtain contraceptives, but applying a lower standard
of review); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (limiting a minor's access
to material that, although not considered obscene for adults, was inappropriate for
minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (upholding the application
of child labor laws to children distributing religious literature and stating that "[t]he
State's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults").
89 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 (holding that "the right of privacy in connection with
decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults"); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (referring to Carey, among other
decisions, and stating unequivocally, "[w]e have no doubt as to the correctness of
those decisions").
" See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("The present case, then,
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantees.").
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1. The Birth of the Right of Privacy
a. Contraception
Although more frequently discussed in the abortion context,91
the right of privacy was first specifically addressed by the Supreme
Court in the context of access to contraception.92 Thirty years ago,
the Supreme Court held that the right of a married couple to seek
contraceptives was protected within a "zone of privacy" that was
created by a "penumbra" of explicit constitutional guarantees,9 and
therefore, invalidated a statute prohibiting access to contraceptives.
In its next major contraception decision, Eisenstadt v. Baird,94 the
Court extended the right to use contraceptives to unmarried
persons,95 although employing a different analysis than it had in
Griswold.9" These two decisions provide the foundation for analyz-
91 The Supreme Court has decided several cases addressing regulation of a minor's
right to an abortion, the most recent of which was decided in 1992. See infra note
124. In contrast, however, the Court has decided only one case addressing a minor's
right to contraception. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(plurality opinion). The Court also appears to be less receptive to developing
contraception law than to developing abortion law, although this may be because
there have been more opportunities for the Court to develop abortion law with
respect to minors. See Morano, supra note 87, at 216 & n.13 (describing the Supreme
Court's development of minors' constitutional rights as "ad hoc" and "piecemeal").
92 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (holding that a Connecticut statute that prohibited
the use of contraceptives by married people violated the constitutional right of
privacy). The right of privacy, however, was first articulated in Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890-1891). SeeJonathan
L. Rue, Comment, The Distribution of Contraceptives to Unemancipated Minors: Does a
Parent Have a Constitutional Right to Be Notified, 69 KY. LJ. 436, 438 n. 14 (1980-1981).
93 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 ("[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." (citation omitted)). The
Court thus invalidated a statute that banned the use of contraceptives. This holding,
however, was limited specifically to the use of contraceptives in the marital
relationship. See id. at 486. The reasoning behind the holding was problematic for
fourJustices, who did not acceptJustice Douglas's "penumbra" analysis in the majority
opinion. See id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring), 502 (White, J., concurring), 507
(Black, J., dissenting), 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
" The Court, in an oft-quoted passage, stated: "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individua, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
" The Court viewed a statute virtually banning the distribution, not use, of
contraceptives, as a prohibition on contraceptives per se. Invoking equal protection
analysis, the Court said, "[i]f under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to
married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons
1996]
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ing a minor's right to receive condoms at public school without first
obtaining consent from her parent.
9 7
b. Abortion
In 1973, the Supreme Court pronounced an extension of the
Griswold privacy doctrine. In the landmark decision Roe v. Wade,
98
the right of privacy was extended to encompass a woman's decision
to terminate her pregnancy.99 The Roe Court established that, like
other fundamental rights, the standard of review for state regulation
of the abortion decision would be strict scrutiny."'0 The Court also
established a special framework within which state regulations would
be scrutinized. 0' This trimester framework, particular to the
abortion context and not applicable to the contraception context,
would govern abortion decisions for the next nineteen years.
Besides drawing from the principles announced in Griswold and
Eisenstadt, the few courts that have actually addressed the issue of a
minor's access to contraceptives in constitutional terms have also
looked to the reasoning employed in cases addressing a minor's
privacy right to an abortion. Courts have analogized the decision of
whether to terminate a pregnancy to the decision of whether to
prevent a pregnancy.'0 2 Since abortion law is and has been more
fully developed by the Supreme Court, contraception law has
would be equally impermissible." Id. Thus, it declared the Massachusetts statute
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 454-55.
" Neither decision, however, addressed whether and to what extent a state could
regulate an individual's access to contraceptives.
s See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 154 ("We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation."). The basic holding in Roe,
that "it is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to terminate her
pregnancy," has withstood constitutional scrutiny. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992). The Supreme Court, however, has partially overruled Roe.
See id. at 873 ("We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be
part of the essential holding of Roe.").
'0 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
101 See id. at 163-66 (explaining the trimester framework).
102 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (stating that "the Constitution protects 'a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy'" and that the underlying theme in these cases concerns
the right to make a decision free from governmental interference (quoting Roe, 410
U.S. at 153)).
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essentially been developed, to the extent that is has been "devel-
oped," in the shadow of abortion law.
2. An Extension of the Right of Privacy to Minors:
Abortion and Contraception
Inevitably, the Court was presented with an issue it had explicitly
refused to decide in Roe 3-the constitutionality of parental
consent requirements for minors. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth"4
was the first Supreme Court case to recognize that minors were
entitled to a constitutionally protected right of privacy.105 The
Court struck down a Missouri abortion statute which, inter alia,
required parental consent before any unmarried female under
eighteen years of age could terminate her pregnancy.'06 It rejected
the state's justification for the statute 7 and, in response to a
blanket provision, announced an equally "blanket" rule: "l[T] he State
does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy," since
the state itself, under Roe, could not possess that veto power.
08
"03 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
101 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (plurality opinion).
115 See id. at 75. Although the plurality opinion recognized that a "State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults," it
nevertheless concluded that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority." Id. at 74-75.
105 See id. at 74.
107 The state argued that the parental consent requirement would strengthen the
family by encouraging intra-family communication, but the Court noted this was not
likely "where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in
conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family
structure." Id. at 75. The Court thus concluded that "[a]ny independent interest the
parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have
become pregnant." Id.
103 See id. at 69, 74. The plurality suggested that some of the minors within the
group addressed by the statute could be mature enough to consent to the abortion
without consulting their parents. See id. at 75. The opinion, however, made a crucial
clarification: "We emphasize that our holding... does not suggest that every minor,
regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy." Id. In doing so, the Court refused to hold that a minor's privacy rights
are equal to those of an adult.
Although Roe articulated that the standard of review for abortion regulation was
strict scrutiny, the Court, after noting that minors' privacy rights were less than those
of adults, concluded that for minors, abortion regulation only had to further a
"significant state interest." Id. On its face, the new, supposedly lower standard of
review seems consistent with the Court's reasoning. The Court, however, neither
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Only one year after Danforth, the Supreme Court applied the
same analysis to minors seeking contraception. 10 9  In Carey v.
Population Services International, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a state ban on the sale or distribution of contraceptives
to minors under sixteen years of age."' The plurality opinion
explicitly extended the right of privacy to minors seeking contracep-
tion.' Thus, any state restriction on this right would have to serve
a "'significant state interest ... that is not present in the case of an
adult.""' 2 The Court asserted, however, that "[s]ince the State may
not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of
parental consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her
pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the
distribution of contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed.""' 3
Although the plurality could have ended its analysis there, it went on
to assess the state's asserted interests in reducing sexual activity
among minors. Finding that the state had not demonstrated a
explained nor proffered evidence for any substantial difference between "significant
state interest" and "compelling state interest."
11 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-99 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
110 See id. at 691-92. The Court also considered the constitutionality of a statute
limiting the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists.
Although the Court acknowledged that such a burden on a person's right to use
contraceptives was not as great as the burden under a total ban, the Court noted that
"the restriction of distribution channels to a small fraction of the total number of
possible retail outlets renders contraceptive devices considerably less accessible to the
public, reduces the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase, and lessens the
possibility of price competition." Id. at 689 (footnote omitted).
... See id. at 693 ("Of particular significance to the decision of this case, the right
of privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well
as to adults.").
112 d. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (plurality
opinion)). Although, as the Court had done in Danforth, Justice Brennan noted the
propriety of "[s] uch lesser scrutiny," none of the analysis that followed differentiated
the two standards. Id. at 693 n.15. Justice Powell argued that the new standard "for
all practical purposes approaches the 'compelling state interest' standard." Id. at 706
(Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
s Id. at 694.
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sufficiently strong interest, n 4 the Court invalidated the ban on
distribution of contraceptives." 5
In more than thirty years of right of privacy jurisprudence, Carey
is the only case in which the Supreme Court has addressed a minor's
right to contraception. Thus, although two lower courts have
decided the constitutionality of parental consent requirements in the
contraception context,"' there is no Supreme Court precedent on
the issue. In the abortion context, however, the Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of parental consent requirements several times.
These are cases to which the lower courts have looked for guidance.
3. Parental Consent and a Minor's Right to Abortion
In Bellotti v. Baird,"7 the companion case to Danforth, the Su-
preme Court refined its holding proscribing "blanket" parental
consent requirements in the abortion context. Citing Danforth, the
Court stated that "if the State decides to require a pregnant minor
to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must
provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the
abortion can be obtained.""' The Court emphasized that the
14 See id. at 696 ("It is enough that we again confirm the principle that when a
State, as here, burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt tojustify that
burden as a rational means for the accomplishment of some significant state policy
requires more than a bare assertion, based on a conceded complete absence of
supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such a policy."). Moreover, the
Court expressed its doubts that restricting a minor's access to contraceptives would
in fact discourage early sexual behavior. See id. at 695.
The Court even noted that the decision here was easier than it had been in the
abortion context because "[t]he State's interests in protection of the mental and
physical health of the pregnant minor, and in protection of potential life are clearly
more implicated by the abortion decision than by the decision to use a nonhazardous
contraceptive." Id. at 694.
"I On the right of privacy issue, the statute was invalidated by a majority of the
Court on the grounds that the severe restriction on persons over 16 burdened those
individuals' right to use contraceptives and no compelling state interest had been
shown to justify the restriction. See id. at 688-91.
The Court also rejected the state's alternative argument that, technically, the
statute did not prevent a physician from giving contraceptives to her patients, and that
therefore, there was no total ban on contraceptive distribution to minors. See id. at
697. The Court rejected this contention and found the statute unconstitutional for
two reasons. First, the state had asserted "no medical necessity for imposing a medical
limitation on the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to minors." Second,
the state could not delegate its "authority to disapprove of minors' sexual behavior to
physicians, who may exercise it arbitrarily." Id. at 697, 699.
116 See supra Part I.C.
117 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
118 Id. at 643 (footnote omitted).
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procedure chosen by the state could not "in fact amount to the
'absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto' that was found impermissible
in Danforth."'1 9  The Massachusetts statute in question in Bellotti
allowed a minor to obtain judicial consent for an abortion, but only
upon the condition that parental consent had already been de-
nied.1 2' Thus, while acknowledging that states traditionally had
more authority to regulate the activities of a minor than those of an
adult,121 the Court nevertheless concluded that "every minor must
have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court
without first consulting or notifying her parents.' 22 Because the statute
unduly burdened a minor's right to an abortion, the Court held it
unconstitutional. 
123
The Supreme Court has since reexamined, in several cases, the
parameters within which a state may require parental consent for
minors seeking an abortion.'24 Thus, the extent to which a state
..9 Id. at 644 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(plurality opinion)). The Bellotti Court elaborated:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that
she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independent-
ly, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The proceeding in
which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of the issue ... will
be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an
effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.
Id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted).
120 See id. at 646-47.
2 Justice Powell argued that the constitutional rights of minors could not be
considered equal to those of adults because of the "peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing." Id. at 634.
" Id. at 647 (emphasis added). The statute also required that parents receive
notice ofjudicial proceedings brought by the minor seeking an abortion. See id.
This was actually the second time the Court addressed the Bellotti case. As there
was some ambiguity in the language of the challenged statute when the Court
originally considered the merits, it remanded the case, under the abstention doctrine,
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for a clear interpretation of the
statute. After the state court held that the statute's provisions included all minors, the
Supreme Court heard the case on its merits. See id. at 623. Ultimately, this
interpretation was crucial to the Court's invalidation of the statute. See id. at 646-47.
" See id. at 648 ("[T]he constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be
unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to court.").
124 See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507-09, 520 (1990)
(upholding an Ohio statute requiring parental notification but providing for judicial
bypass); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93 (1983)
(upholding a parental consent statute that provided for ajudicial bypass procedure);
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983) (invalidat-
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may regulate in this context is now relatively clear.12 Most recent-
ly, the Court made it obvious that it did not want to reconsider the
issue, stating plainly: "We have been over most of this ground
before. Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may
require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a
parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass
procedure."26 Therefore, the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
ing a city ordinance which required all minors under age fifteen to obtain parental
consent or a court order because "the State [did not] provide art alternative
procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature
to make the abortion decision herself"), overruled on other grounds, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422-23
(1990) (invalidating a two-parent notification requirement); Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484
U.S. 171, 172 (1987) (mem., per curiam), aff'g by an equally divided court 763 F.2d
1532, 1538, 1536 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding the imposition of a 24-hour waiting period
unconstitutional because it unduly burdened a minor's right to obtain an abortion);
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-13 (1981) (upholding a parental notification
requirement for immature, unemancipated minors, reasoning that although "a state
may not constitutionally legislate a blanket, unreviewable power of parents to veto
their daughter's abortion, a statute setting out a 'mere requirement of parental
notice' does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor"
(citations omitted)). Subsequently, the Court characterized the H.L. decision as
"upholding a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to
mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification
detrimental to their best interests." See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 n.17.
12 In marked contrast, this is not true for a minor's decision to seek contracep-
tion.
126 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (emphasis added).
Until recently, strict scrutiny was the standard of review for all state regulations
involving the right of privacy, irrespective of the particular right encompassed within
the rubric of the right of privacy, such as the right to marriage, the right to abortion,
and the right to contraception. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686
(1977) (plurality opinion) (explaining that regulation of contraception "may be
validated by a sufficiently compelling state interest"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 73-75 (1976) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the district court's conclusion
that a parental consent requirement served the compelling interest of "safeguarding
the family unit"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that the state's
compelling interest in protecting the health of the mother would only be valid after
the first trimester); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 450-51 (1972) (holding that a
statute forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons is
unconstitutionally overbroad because certain contraceptives constitute no health
hazard, and therefore, the statute did not advance a compelling state interest in
preserving public health); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding
that a law forbidding the use of contraceptives, rather than regulating their
manufacture or sale, is not narrowly tailored and invades privacy interests of married
persons). In 1992, however, the Court in Casey, 505 U.S. at 833, while leaving the
central holding of Roe intact, concluded that a new standard of review would apply in
abortion cases. See id. at 874. Rejecting as too rigid the trimester framework it had
announced in Roe, see id. at 873 ("The trimester framework suffers from these basic
flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest;
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and affirmatively declared, that even a minor has a right, although
limited, to reproductive autonomy. Perhaps more importantly,
however, the abortion cases have clearly limited the extent to which
the state may intrude upon the minor's decisionmaking process by
prohibiting states from delegating absolute veto power to a third
party.
4. Parental Consent and a Minor's Right to Contraception
Although several lower court decisions have addressed parental
consent or notification requirements imposed on minors seeking
contraceptives, most have been decided on statutory grounds
only."'27 Only two cases have addressed, in constitutional terms and
and in practice it undervalues the State's interest in potential life, as recognized in
Roe."), the Court instead adopted the "undue burden" standard, see id. at 874 ("Only
where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause."). Under the new standard, a state regulation that "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus" is unconstitutional. Id. at 877, 879-901 (upholding,
except for the spousal consent requirement, all of the challenged provisions of the
Pennsylvania law including a parental consent requirement for minors that provided
ajudicial bypass procedure).
In articulating this new, lower standard, the Court repeatedly referred specifically
to the abortion decision and its particularities. The Court felt that the undue burden
standard was "the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest [in protecting
potential life] with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty." Id. at 876. In the
contraception context, however, the state's interest in protecting potential life is a
prematurely asserted interest. Rather, the argument for imposing a parental consent
requirement in connection with the use of contraceptives by minors has generally
centered upon the need to encourage intra-familial communication and to support
parental authority within the family. See Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School
Dist., 646 A.2d 689, 691-92 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1994); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 428 (1990) (noting that the alleged purpose of the challenged parental
notification provision was fostering parent-child relationships); infra note 127 (the
"squeal rule" cases) (noting that the same, albeit rejected, argument was asserted by
state legislatures in their attempt to impose parental notification requirements on all
minors seeking contraceptives from federally funded family planning clinics). Thus,
the new Casey undue burden test does not and should not apply in the contraception
context.
"27 The most notable of these cases are the so-called "squeal rule" cases. See New
York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part and reversed in part sub nom.
New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983); Planned Parenthood Fed'n v.
Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v.
Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In 1981 Congress amended Title X, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(a) to include a provision encouraging familial involvement in the decision to
seek family planning services from clinics funded by Title X. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 931(b) (1), 95 Stat. 357, 570 (1981).
Soon thereafter, the Department of Health passed a regulation to enforce its
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from the perspective of minors' rights, the issue of mandatory
parental consent requirements before contraceptives are dispensed
to minors.128  These two cases were also decided on statutory
grounds. The courts, however, did not stop at that analysis, feeling
compelled to articulate in dicta opinions on the amorphous
constitutional issues as well. Nevertheless, the reasoning employed
was sound and relates well to the question of minors' access to
condoms in the public school setting.
In TH. v. Jones,129 the court considered the constitutionality of
a Utah regulation requiring written parental consent before any
minor could receive contraceptives from federally funded family
planning clinics."' Decided before Danforth and Carey, the court
in TH. showed remarkable insight in observing:
interpretation of the new amendment. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (1983). The regulation
required all clinics receiving Title X funding to notify parents of a minor seeking
contraceptives before dispensing them to the minor. See id. Both cases held that the
regulation was outside the authority of the agency because the regulation was in direct
conflict with previously expressed congressional intent. See New York v. Heckler, 719
F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (2d Cir. 1983); Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d
650, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Thus, confidential access to contraceptives in Title X
clinics is not only available, it is mandated. In the face of such (conveniently) clear
legislation, it is understandable that many courts faced with similar challenges decided
the cases on statutory grounds, avoiding the constitutional questions. It was a rather
easy and obvious solution upon which many courts capitalized. For a thorough
discussion of the controversy and an analysis of the large amount of litigation that
ensued, see Brenda D. Hofrnan, Note, The Squeal Rule: Statutory Resolution and
Constitutional Implications-Burdening the Minor's Right of Privacy, 1984 DUKE Lj. 1325.
"2 See Planned Parenthood v. Matheson, 582 F Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983); T.H.
v.Jones, 425 F Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975), affid on statutory grounds only, 425 U.S. 986
(1976). Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980),
Curtis v. School Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753
(1996) and Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), have also
addressed the issue of parental consent requirements-Irwin in the context of family
planning clinics, and Alfonso and Curtis in the context of condom availability programs
in schools. See supra Part I.C. All three of these cases were brought by parents
claiming that there should be a parental consent requirement. Thus, parental rights,
not minors' rights, have been central. In a pending case, parents have filed suit
claiming there should be an express parental consent requirement. See Parents
United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., No. CIV.A.96-3791, 1996 WL 442887 (E.D.
Pa. July 31, 1996). There is already a parental opt-out provision in the program
challenged in that case. See Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., 646
A.2d 689, 690 (Commw. Ct. Pa. 1994). Although the parents' primary argument was
statutory, now that the case has been removed to federal court, the court will address
the constitutional issues. See Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., No.
CIV.A.96-3791, 1996 WL 442887 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1996).
2 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975).
' See id. at 879-82. The plaintiff specifically claimed that the statute impermissibly
burdened her constitutional right of privacy. See id. at 881.
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[W] e perceive no developmental differences between minors and
adults that may affect the gravity of the right asserted by sexually
active minors to family planning services and materials. The
interest of minors in access to contraceptives is one of fundamental
importance. The financial, psychological and social problems
arising from teenage pregnancy and motherhood argue for our
recognition of the right of minors to privacy as being equal to that
of adults. This is not to say that the state may not regulate that
right in pursuit of some compelling interest of its own; rather, we
hold that the fundamental nature of minors' right to privacy must
be considered in assessing the constitutionality of state-imposed
restrictions on access to contraceptives."'
Reasoning that the regulation only affected indigent minors'
access to contraceptives; 132 that a teenager's decision to use contra-
ceptives, as distinguished from the decision to have an abortion, was
not irrevocable; and that parental involvement in a minor's decision
to obtain contraceptives was not foreclosed; the court determined
that the state's interests were insufficient to justify such an interfer-
ence with individual rights.1 3  Specifically, the court held that the
state's asserted interests in enforcing parental authority13 4 and in
protecting minors "'from the evil effects and unsuspected harm of
actions which go against the mores of society' 135 were not compel-
ling,136 and thus, the regulation was struck down as unconstitution-
al. 137 Although the Supreme Court subsequently accepted the case
for review, it affirmed, in a one-paragraph opinion, only on statutory
grounds.'3
131 Id.
152 See id. at 881-82 ("Thus, even if we were to sustain the state's regulations in
their effect upon plaintiff's privacy, they would nevertheless be subject to attack on
equal protection grounds.").
133 See id. at 881.
"I Recognizing the deference to which parental rights have been legally entitled,
the court, nevertheless, stated, "[w]e believe that, in appropriate cases, the state's
interest in enforcing parental prerogatives must yield to the fundamental rights of
minors." Id. at 882 (citations omitted).
1" Id. at 881 (citation omitted).
136 See id. at 882 ("[WI e hold that the state may not enforce the choice of parents
in conflict with a minor's constitutional right of free access to birth control
information and services.").
137 See id.
"Jones v. T.H., 425 U.S. 986, 986 (1976) ("Without indicating any views on
whether the District Court's decision on the constitutional issue was sound,judgment
affirmed insofar as it invalidated the challenged regulation of the Utah Division of
Family Services as inconsistent with the Social Security Act.").
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Only one court has decided the issue on constitutional grounds
with the benefit of the Carey and Danforth decisions as existing legal
precedent. In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson,'39 the court was
confronted with a challenge to a Utah law requiring parental
notification before a minor could be provided with contracep-
tives. 4  The reasoning employed by the Matheson court here is
particularly instructive. After reviewing the contraception and
abortion cases, 141 and likening the intimacy and personal risks
involved in the decision to seek contraceptives to those involved in
the decision to seek an abortion,' the court concluded: "The
undisputed evidence in this case confirms that whether to bear or to
beget a child, not whether to be sexually active, is at the heart of the
decision to use contraceptives."143 Thus, as in the abortion context,
the state could "not impose a blanket parental notification require-
ment on minors seeking to exercise their constitutionally protected
right to decide whether to bear or beget a child by using contracep-
tives."'" The court ultimately determined that since there was no
alternate procedure whereby a mature minor or a minor who could
demonstrate that parental notification was against her best interests
could obtain contraceptives confidentially, the statute was unconsti-
tutional.1
45
The fact that the right of privacy under current legal doctrine is
a disputed concept, 146 particularly with respect to minors, does not,
however, mean that there is no possible legal claim for students-the
persons who are most profoundly affected by, and who are truly at
the center of, the condom controversy. It is clear from the above
cases that courts have found the imposition of blanket parental
consent or notification provisions to be at least constitutionally
1s9 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983) (mem.).
'40 See id. at 1002.
141 See id. at 1007-09.
142 See id. at 1008-09 ("[A] decision concerning the use of contraceptives is similar
to the decision whether to have an abortion in that it cannot be delayed until the
minor reaches the age of majority without posing the risk of serious harm to the
minor.").
11 Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
144 Id.
145 See id.
14 Even before the right of privacy became conceptualized primarily as a right
concerning decisions about marriage, childbirth and contraception, other "rights of
privacy" were controversial. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
("We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of 'privacy and
repose.'").
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suspect. Thus, although a minor's right to contraception has not yet
been addressed in the context of a school condom availability
program, there is by no means "a general acceptance of the idea"
that a school board has an absolute right to impose parental
involvement on a minor who is responsible enough to realize the
importance of "safe sex" and seeks to receive condoms at school.
147
B. Reconceptualizing Minors' Rights: A Child-Centered Perspective
The prevalent theory of constitutional interpretation describes a
system of negative rights which constrains the state from interfering
with the liberties of rational, autonomous individuals. 14' Because
this liberal theory of individual rights "ha[s] been predicated on
voices of independent, individual actors, exercising free will in
asserting their often conflicting rights .... law has difficulty
expressing notions of 'children's rights' as a counterweight or
boundary to parents' rights."1 49  Minors differ from this model of
legal personhood because they are dependent upon others for
support and are immature. 5 Based on these differences, the law
tends to ignore the children's realities-their experiences, needs and
perspectives-replacing them instead with adult conceptions of what
those realities are.' 5 ' In such a system: "Parents and the state
might know and do what is best for adults. Individual and collective
147 But see Sanders, supra note 41, at 1512. The author stated:
[D]enying students free access to condoms might very well infringe upon
their constitutional rights. It is doubtful, however, that today's Court would
embrace such a proposition .... Further, no one has ever challenged
excusal provisions in a sex education curriculum as violative of minors'
rights, suggesting a general acceptance of the idea.
Id. at 1511-12.
"4 See Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 11, 23-26 (1994) (describing the "liberal
model of constitutional personhood").
" See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective
on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1749, 1842 (1993) (exploring "the ways
in which legal norms of family and fathering currently fail children" by drawing from
children's stories and popular culture as well as case law).
10 See Fitzgerald, supra note 148, at 85-98; Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 1827-29.
151 SeeWoodhouse, supra note 149, at 1827 ("The failings in case law... stem from
a perspective on relations between the generations and within families that
characterizes itself as concerned with children but places adults and adult perspectives
ahead of children's real concerns."); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of
Children's Needs, Children's Rights;" The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYUJ. PUB.
L. 321, 321 (1994) (advocating a legal perspective that views the parents' role as one
of "trusteeship rather than ... ownership").
THE CONDOM CONTROVERSY
adults can readily define and achieve adult purposes. Neither,
however, gives voice to the compelling needs and experiences of real
children.' 5 2 This exclusion of children's own voices in the law is
explicable, though not justifiable, because at some level, adults
simply
fail to understand children's differences. We cannot know, finally,
how children perceive the world and their place in it, why and how
they bond with each other and adults, why their priorities are
"childish" and what that means. Unable to understand, we
denigrate the child's perspective as uneducated or immature,
imagining the child's perspective as an inferior version of our own.
Fortified in our superiority, we then feel justified in ignoring
children's perspectives and substituting adult purposes for
them.1
53
The most unfortunate consequence is the fact that the social
dominance over children that ensues from the state incorporating
this power relationship in and as law "is a deeply entrenched
injustice towards children, so familiar to adults as to be almost
invisible."'54  The Alfonso, Curtis and Parents United courts, there-
fore, ignored the issue of minors' rights because they, too, fell prey
to a legal system that assumes an adult-centric perspective that
discounts children's reality.'55 The law's effective exclusion of
children's voices may appear to be an efficient approach-because
the built-in protectionism helps prevent children from hurting
themselves, and because a real effort to hear and learn about
children's realities requires resources-but it is inherently inaccurate.
As some commentators have shown, children are failed by this
silencing approach.'56 To remedy these failures, the law must
152 Fitzgerald, supra note 148, at 17.
1' Id. at 98 (footnote omitted). Arguing that children's differences have been
exaggerated and distorted, Professor Woodhouse postulates a similar explanation:
"Adults have discounted children's likenesses to free humans[, adults,] in order to
excuse their unwillingness to respect children's needs and experiences in exercising
adult authority, or to credit children's growing measure of autonomy as they mature."
Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 1829.
'5'Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 1827.
'5 See Fitzgerald, supra note 148, at 21 (arguing that in order to "incorporat[e]
children into our legal model of personhood," adults and the law must seek out, "hear
and learn from children's experiences and perspectives"); Woodhouse, supra note 149,
at 1749 (introducing a "critical perspective ... that... evaluate[s] parents' authority
over children and their obligations to children ... through the lens of children's
needs and experiences").
6 See Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 1839 ("The dissonance between real, willful
children and their legal images as pliable objects who lack will has a protective
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listen hard for children's needs and experiences, and attribute legal
meaning to what it hears; it must change structurally so that legal
rules bear some relation to children's realities.'5 7 There must be
a respect for children as dependent but evolving individuals with
growing capacities, not yet autonomous, but still possessing rights.
Some adults may challenge a child-centered perspective as a threat
to parental authority,"" but its purpose is merely to give a voice to
an unheard population.'59 Ultimately, children must be moved
purpose as a buffer between children and their premature exercise of will in a
dangerous world. However, it also undermines the interests of children by excusing
adults from caring or knowing what children think, feel, and want." (footnote
omitted)); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 148, at 84-84 (showing, through a discussion
of relevant cases, how children's personhood has been ignored by child support and
custody law); Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 1785-1809 (arguing that children are
hurt by custody and visitation law's refusal to recognize "gestational fathers,"
biological strangers who have a close connection to a child, as being in the best
interests of the child).
117 See Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 1838-41 (stressing the importance of adults
questioning themselves as to how children's experiences and values have been left out
of the law).
"' Out of fear of this threat, some parents have urged Congress and state
legislatures to recognize their rights as parents, rights that are either statutory or
constitutional in nature. See, e.g., Greg D. Erken, Question: Does the U.S. Need a
Parental-Rights Amendment? Yes: Halt Social Engineering of the Nation's Families, WASH.
TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 18 (arguing that "[c]learly, the violation of parental rights has
become a systemic problem.... Parents deserve an explicit right grounded in their
state constitution-not a court-interpreted right."); RobertJ. Samuelson, Sounds Great,
Won't Work: The 'Parental Rights' Amendment Is Too Broad and Too Vague for Anyone's
Good, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 49, 49 (negating that the government is "weakening
families by somehow revoking parental rights," and asserting instead that "[i]f
anything, the process works in reverse: the weakening of families-through more
divorces, out-of-wedlock births and two-earner couples-has pulled government into
the breach"); Richard Whitmire, Parental Rights Movement Surges: Bill Pending in
Congress and 29 States, FLA. TODAY, Aug. 18, 1996, at 10A ("To date, legislatures in
Kansas, North Dakota and Virginia have rejected parental rights amendments. .. .");
The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 103d Cong. 68-70 (1995) (testimony of
Rep. Steve Largent) ("The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act will codify that the
right to direct the upbringing of one's child is a fundamental right-not a non-
fundamental right as currently treated by the courts.").
For a critique of the proposed legislation, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A
Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics
of Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 395 (1996) (arguing that the
Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995 "demonstrates the fallacy of adopting
either a purely public or a purely private definition of the family or of American
family policy").
" SeeWoodhouse, supranote 149, at 1840 ("Asking the child question[s], listening
to children's authentic voices, and employing child-centered practical reasoning are
not the same as allowing children to decide. They are strategies to insure that
children's authentic voices are heard and acknowledged by adults who make
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from the margin to the center of formal legal analysis so that
children can be valued as children, valued for their own sake, and
not for the sake of adult society.
[W]e now systematically exclude children's perspectives from
representation. The law substitutes for real children and their
interests the interests instead of the parents or of the state. We
craft laws that serve, not real children, but adults as autonomous
individuals or, at best, children as potential adults. Listening to
and valuing children's perspectives can begin to transform this
jurisprudence, forcing us to countenance, not substituted interests,
but the perspectives of real children. We take a step toward this
transformation when we repudiate our self-serving identification of
maturity as justification for denying children standing in legal
disputes. When we repudiate the pretext of maturity for denying
children's perspectives, we can begin to consider seriously whether
and how children are different from us adults. We can then begin
to propose legal mechanisms designed to value children's perspec-
tives, designed to value children as children and childhood as
inherently compelling. 160
Admittedly, children have fared better in the constitutional arena
of abortion than they have in family law jurisprudence. Despite the
difficulty of expressing minors' rights under a liberal tradition of
individual rights, the Supreme Court has declared that minors, like
adults, have constitutional privacy rights. Somewhat conspicuously,
however, privacy is a right which happens to bear upon adult
freedoms as well, whereas those things that would, at a basic level,
concern children, such as the threat of poverty and loss of parental
nurturing, do not bear independently on adult freedoms.'61 Thus,
they are not parallel concerns of adults.162
Interestingly, adult-centricity emanated from the cases that
granted these privacy liberties to minors. One case, Bellotti v. Baird,
decisions.")
11 Fitzgerald, supra note 148, at 92.
161 See id. at 88. Professor Fitzgerald laments:
The issues themselves indicate that children's constitutional status depends
on alignment with adult power. Children's constitutional rights to abortion
and free speech are asserted, if embattled, because those rights are
important to adults. Children's rights to child support or standing in
custody disputes are denied, meanwhile, because those issues fail to rally a
sufficiently powerful adult lobby.
Id. at 89.
162 See id. at 84 ("Children command legal respect for their personhood, then, only
when their interests coincide with adults' [interests].").
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is particularly instructive.163 Since Bellotti, if the State wishes to
adopt a parental consent requirement, it must also provide for an
alternative procedure whereby a mature minor, or an immature
minor who can convince a court that parental involvement is against
her best interests, may bypass the parental notification require-
ment.164
Thus, a minor who the court deems to be mature can make the
decision without her parent's consent and without the court's
consent. A minor who the court thinks is not sufficiently mature to
make the decision on her own must prove to the court that the
abortion is in her best interests if she wants to avoid telling her
parents. The maturity determination, however, depends on whether
the minor's petition reflects an adult perspective or a perspective
unique to childhood. In other words, a judge makes the maturity
determination from an adult perspective, so that a determination of
maturity in a minor is really just a search for an adult perspec-
tive:
165
[A] finding from an adult perspective in any case or controversy
that a child is "immature" means little more than that the child is
different somehow from an adult. The child manifesting a
perspective unique to childhood differs from an adult, and is by
definition "immature." The child who thinks and speaks as a child,
therefore, cannot gain our legal attention.
By legally disabling immature children from voicing their
perspectives, we deny that a child's perspective bears legal signifi-
cance. The law prevents us, then, from valuing children as children
and permits us to value only those children who mirror adults. By
legally recognizing mature children, we announce that children who
manifest adult perspectives, children who seem less different from
us, may also enjoy constitutional personhood. The mature minor,
then, the child whose perspective comports with our own, accesses
our attention with legal standing. When children voice a childhood
perspective, when they remain manifestly different from us,
however, we do not heed them at all.'66
163 See id. at 85-87.
" ' See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-40 (1979); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also supra Part IIA.3.
165 The same argument would apply to a judge's determination of whether an
abortion would be in the best interests of a minor who the court found to be
immature.
11 Fitzgerald, supra note 148, at 87 (footnotes omitted).
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Although minors have not been valued fully as children in the
case law, they nevertheless do have a right of privacy and the
alternative of a judicial bypass when parental consent requirements
are imposed in the abortion context. The interests of minors were
at least considered in the privacy cases, albeit from a uniquely adult
perspective. Minors' interests, however, have not yet been consid-
ered in the context of school condom availability programs.
III. RESPECTING A MINOR'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY
IN SCHOOL CONDOM AVAILABILIy PROGRAMS
Carey stated that a minor has a constitutionally protected right to
obtain contraceptives,167 and the Supreme Court has recently reaf-
firmed that decision."t8 The Supreme Court has also stated that
"students do not shed their constitutional rights . . .at the school-
house gate. ""' In the context of condom availability programs in
public schools, parents may object that they have some legally
recognized interests over the education of their children. 70 They
do not, however, have power over a school's curriculum. 171 Given
this background, the role of minors' rights in school condom
availability programs can be considered.
Respecting a minor's right of privacy in school condom availabili-
ty programs must begin at the school board level. Although school
boards state that the rationales for implementing condom availability
programs are the realities and consequences of teen sexuality, and
although they admit that mandatory parental involvement in the
student's decision to receive condoms will deter students from
seeking condoms-a result which, presumably, is in direct opposition
to the stated goals-school boards are nevertheless implementing
parental consent and opt-out requirements. The rationale for doing
so is not a compelling state interest to protect potential life, as is
617 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
11 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (stating that with
respect to Carey, Griswold and Eisenstadt, "[w]e have no doubt as to the correctness of
those decisions").
169 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
170 See supra Part I.C.
171 SeeEpperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (declaring that "the state may
not adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which 'aid or oppose'
any religion"); Ware v. Valley Stream High School Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 427 (N.Y.
1989) ("[P]arents have no constitutional right to tailor public school programs to
individual preferences, including religious preferences.").
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argued in the abortion cases. As Justice Brennan declared: "The
State's interests ... are clearly more implicated by the abortion
decision than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contracep-
tive."'72 In the school condom availability program context, rather,
the state's compelling interest would be to prevent pregnancy and
the spread of HIV among minors. The real explanation for why
school boards adopt these kinds of requirements, therefore, lies in
the politics involved. Quite simply, school boards succumb to the
political pressures from parents and special interest groups173_-and
adult-centricity prevails. 74 In the public hearings that usually
accompany a school board's decision to adopt a condom program,
the board should strive to keep an open ear to the minors in-
volved 175 and earnestly listen to their experiences and needs, rather
than maintain a misguided focus on parental authority.
176
In assessing whether and to what degree a minor's right is
burdened by parental consent requirements in school condom
programs, the law must recognize children's views and experiences
as relevant evidence of their needs. 177  A court should sincerely
' Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
' "The variations in condom availability programs tend to result from concerns
about overcoming parental and community objections and avoiding liability." Stryker
et al., supra note 50, at xvii.
174 See supra note 161 (commenting that the law only recognizes children's
personhood when children's interests are aligned with sufficiently strong adult
interests).
175 See supra note 38 (quoting a Brooklyn student's plea to the school board).
176 If school boards really listened for minors' realities, they would not so easily
give in to pressures from parents. One commentator has argued that a focus on
parental authority is misguided:
[I] t is a misconception to equate the preservation of family structure with
reinforcement of parental control. Maintaining the integrity of the family
is not only a reflection of interests of the parents. It also mirrors a
distinguishable, relational privacy interest ... the thrust of which is not
merely to protect parental authority, but also to safeguard from state
encroachment the intimacy and autonomy of the family relationship.
Where, as in the contraceptive context, individual interests of parent and
child are likely to collide, protection of their shared relational interest
assumes independent importance and should not be directed at reinforcing
the values of parents alone, which results when a parental consent
requirement is imposed, but rather at fostering autonomous intrafamilial
resolution of controversies.
Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive
Controversy, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1001, 1017-18 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
' See Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 1863 ("By focusing on children's needs, and
recognizing children's experiences and views as relevant evidence of their needs, a
generist perspective seeks a more authentic view of children.").
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evaluate the realities of the minors seeking the condoms-the high
rate of sexual activity, the increasing incidence of AIDS and the low
and inconsistent use of contraception among minors. 178 Another
reality of minors is that condom availability without parental consent
in nonschool settings does not translate into condoms being easily
accessible. 179 Judge Eiber, the dissenting judge in the New York case
Alfonso v. Fernandez,8 ' recognized, albeit in the context of parental
rights, the absence of any significant difference between a minor's
access to condoms in general and her access to condoms in school.
Judge Eiber noted:
State and Federally funded programs providing for condom
distribution to minors without parental consent have been in effect
for years. The significant issue in this case is whether voluntary
condom distribution to minors in public schools so differs from
accepted similar Federal- and State-funded programs as to be
violative of constitutionally protected parental rights.... Since I
do not view the distribution of condoms as a health service, but
rather as a practical accessory to effectuate a health education
program, I find no rational basis for discerning either statutory
violations or a violation of constitutionally protected parental rights
resulting from the distribution of these nonintrusive devices, merely
because preventive health concerns affecting children are being
addressed in public schools.' 8'
Some judges have made strides in the direction of listening to the
realities of minors. Judge Eiber's powerful dissent in Alfonso stated:
Clearly, it is not the proper role of the educational system to
ignore reality. Despite the fact that teenagers are instructed that
abstinence is the most effective method of preventing the transmis-
sion of the HIV virus, many teenagers are nevertheless sexually
178 See supra Part I.A. Although focusing on the parents' rights, the Yoder Court
stated: "To be sure, the power of the parent... may be subject to limitation ... if
it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
have a potential for significant social burdens." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-
34 (1972). A parent's refusal to allow her sexually active child to receive condoms at
school could certainly have adverse consequences for the child, and ultimately, for
society.
179 See, e.g., FAcTSHEET, supra note 34, at 1. A 1988 survey, which examined the
availability of condoms in drugstores and convenience stores in the Washington, D.C.
area, found that: one-third of the stores kept condoms behind the counter, forcing
teenagers to ask for them; only 13% of the stores clearly marked where contraceptives
were located; and adolescent girls who had asked for help encountered resistance or
condemnation from clerks 40% of the time. See id.
'8 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
181 Id. at 273 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
19961
188 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145: 149
active, and must be advised that condom use is imperative. Public
schools, with their unique ability to reach large numbers of
teenagers, can play a significant role in urging the benefit of
abstinence, in increasing AIDS awareness, and in alerting those
students who are sexually active of the importance of using
condoms in order to reduce the risk of disease. Moreover, the
condom [availability] component of the educational program makes
condoms more readily accessible to those students who are already
sexually active and might otherwise engage in unprotected
intercourse.1
82
Justice Stevens has also acknowledged the realities of teenhood:
Common sense indicates that many young people will engage in
sexual activity regardless of what the . . . [1] egislature does; and
further, that the incidence of venereal disease and premarital
pregnancy is affected by the availability or unavailability of
contraceptives. Although young persons theoretically may avoid
those harms by practicing total abstention, inevitably many will
not. 183
With all of these realities in mind, the law, thus, should not treat
condom availability in schools differently than it has treated condom
availability in other cases: parental consent requirements overly
burden minors' rights to obtain contraception. At the very least, if
school boards want to adopt parental consent requirements, they
must also provide for some form of bypass procedure as states must
do in abortion cases. Many schools have health professionals or
administrators who could serve the function that the judge serves in
an abortion petition. Any parental consent or parental "opt-out"
requirement in a condom availability program would require such a
bypass mechanism, because both types of provisions grant a veto
power to a third party over the decision of a minor to seek condoms
at school. If a school board does not want to adopt a bypass
procedure, then the only parental involvement which might pass
scrutiny is a parental notification provision.' Otherwise, parental
"s Id. at 274. Judge Eiber went on to say: "Clearly, many parents... are seeking
to provide guidance to their children and to protect their health and morality. The
majority overlooks the unfortunate reality that many children lack such interested
parents. Many children have no parents to provide guidance and discipline .... " Id.
at 275.
11 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
"I In the abortion context, the Supreme Court has once invalidated and once
upheld a parental notification requirement. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,
423 (1990) (invalidating a Minnesota parental notification requirement); H.L. v.
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consent requirements unconstitutionally infringe on a minor's right
to contraception.
CONCLUSION
AIDS, teen pregnancy and teen sexuality statistics are astounding.
Drugstores and family planning clinics have not stemmed the tide of
AIDS infection or pregnancy among adolescents. More than 420
schools across the country have acknowledged the magnitude of the
public health problem by adopting condom availability programs.
Although schools do not have a duty to provide students with
condoms, once schools decide to implement such programs, they
may not then adopt blanket parental consent requirements, thereby
conferring upon parents the power to veto their children's responsi-
ble decision to seek contraception. At the very least, schools insisting
on adopting parental consent or opt-out requirements must also then
adopt some form of bypass procedure, as is constitutionally required
in the abortion context. When viewed through the proper lens-a
child-centered perspective that gives legal meaning to the needs,
experiences and realities of today's teenagers-it becomes clear that
condom availability programs merely seek to provide minors with a
means of exercising their constitutionally protected liberty interest
and right. Although a school board may fall victim to political and
ideological opposition, the Constitution should not be compromised
by the condom controversy.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (upholding a Utah parental notification
requirement).
Some commentators have argued, however, that even notice would unconstitu-
tionally infringe on a minor's right to contraception. SeeFinger, supra note 26, at 220-
23 (arguing that the "right of minors to obtain contraceptives should be accorded the
same weight against competing state interests as the corresponding adult right of
access"); Louise E. Tudzarov, Parents' Right to Be Notified When Their Children Are
Provided Contraceptives by State Funded Family Planning Clinics, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1135,
1143-44, 1146 (1979) (arguing that states' interest in protecting the privacy rights of
minors outweighs the putative parental right of authority over minors). Regardless
of the constitutionality of parental notification requirements, there are strong policy
reasons, supported by empirical data, which suggest that a school board should not
require any sort of parental involvement, but rather should encourage it.
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